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ABSTRACT
A (communication) protocol captures how agents interoperate by
specifying the messages they exchange. In particular, since the
information content of messages characterizes the interactions a
protocol specifies, message types can improve interoperation by
strengthening the specification of what each agent may legitimately
expect from another agent. In addition, in implementations, typing
information can enable improved verification of agents.
We introduce Supple, a protocol specification language that ex-
presses message schemas with typed parameters. Supple enables
definition of causal types for parameters that constrain how other
parameters are computed in a protocol enactment. We give the
formal semantics of Supple; characterize the liveness and safety of
Supple specifications; and provide decision procedures for them.
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1 INTRODUCTION
TheMAS Setting Our setting is a decentralized multiagent system
(MAS) of autonomous and heterogeneous agents communicating
via asynchronous messaging. Each agent acts on behalf of some real-
world principal. An agent would be independently implemented
or configured by its principal—without necessarily knowing the
details of the other agents. Successful interoperation in such a
setting requires precise specification of each agent’s expectations—
so the agents can comply with them.
In a decentralized MAS, a protocol enables interoperation be-
tween agents by specifying their mutual expectations separately
from their internal decision making. That is, a protocol yields de-
sign requirements on how the agents exchange information. Major
applications in finance and healthcare specify protocols. For ex-
ample, the international healthcare standard, HL7 [12], specifies
protocols to support interactions among healthcare stakeholders.
Financial protocols as well, e.g., for syndicated loans [14], involve
complex interactions and information models.
Problem For simplicity, we adopt an insurance auditing scenario
as our running example. Auditing protocols are essential in many
real world applications. In healthcare, HIPAA (US) and NHS (UK)
specify auditing protocols involving several stakeholders. In our
scenario, the agents involved are a subscriber S, insurer I, and
auditor A. S buys policies from I which it uses to make claims. A
requests reports from an insurer for auditing, which list the claims
that were paid out but for less than the initial claimed amount.
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A protocol language must deal with the following interoperation
failures. One, liveness failure: the insurer may lack the information
needed to compute a report because it may have only a partial view
of all the information communicated. Two, integrity failure: if I
can compute the report, it should contain all and only the correct
results. Three, safety failure: agents must not face a race situation
where each attempts to produce authoritative results, e.g., if both I
and S are enabled to produce results of the same request.
Our problem is how can a protocol language support statically
verifying avoidance of the above failures? And, how can we re-
late the structure of communication in a MAS to the structure of
information exchanged between agents.
Approach Our proposed language, Supple, adopts a declarative
framework to ensure that protocols can be flexibly enacted in a
decentralized and asynchronous manner [22]. An underlying intu-
ition is that communication both produces and is constrained by
information. Supple’s main idea is to use typed parameters as first-
class language elements for dynamically specifying types of the
information to be exchanged at run time. In particular, it introduces
causal types for parameters that constrain how other parameters
are computed in a protocol enactment.
A causal type specifies the type of information on which a com-
putation is performed, and the type of information the computation
yields. For example, a causal type may specify a computation that
can be applied to the claimed and paid amounts of an insurance
policy to compute the total payable amount of the policy. The au-
ditor may send a request for a report including a function of the
above causal type to express the selection criteria for the claims
to be considered in the report and the type of information to be
reported for those claims.
Supple yields three main benefits. First, agents may enact the
same protocol instantiated with different functions to produce dif-
ferent report types. Second, agents can be verified against those
types. Third, protocols can be verified taking parameter types into
account. For example, if a protocol enables the auditor to send a
function of the above causal type to the insurer, it must enable the
insurer to acquire the necessary information to apply the function
during the enactment. Otherwise, the protocol is incorrect. Parame-
ter types enable static checking of protocols to prevent such errors
even though a function may be formulated at run time.
Literature Existing protocol specification approaches inadequately
specify what information may be exchanged through a protocol,
leading to ad hocmethods to ensure correctness. Several approaches
capture control flow: UML sequence diagrams [4], session types
[18], WS-CDL [25], RASA [16]) and 2CL [3], but none captures
information flow. FIPA [10] adds ontology annotations to messages
but doesn’t relate information across messages. Gunay et al. [11],
assign meanings to messages but don’t specify the message con-
tent precisely upon which the meanings rely. Information flow
approaches, [22, 24] model content weakly, as uninterpreted values.
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Chopra et al.’s [6] Splee incorporates queries into protocols, e.g., to
specify that the winner in an English auction protocol is the highest
bidder, but considers them only as untyped descriptive annotations,
which are not part of Splee’s formalization. Supple shares some
motivations with business artifacts and data-centric models [9, 19],
which combine information abstractions with process. Montali et al.
[17] address verification of commitment-based MAS with queries.
However these works typically do not address decentralization,
treating a multiagent system as a single machine.
Baldoni et al. [2] formalize agent types to check them for compat-
ibility with commitment protocols. Damiani et al. [8] formalize type
soundness of MAS in terms of agents and artifacts. Kakas et al. [13]
support agent reasoning for communication. Supple focuses on the
complementary concern of specifying a protocol independent of
agent reasoning as a way to guide the development of interoperable
agents. In decentralized MAS, a protocol must handle loosely cou-
pled, asynchronous communication whereas the above approaches
require synchronous communication via a shared infrastructure.
Contributions Supple provides (1) a language for enriched pro-
tocol specification; (2) a novel definition of safe and live proto-
cols; and (3) associated verification algorithms. Supple’s novelty
lies in introducing type abstractions for information in interaction
whereas existing work does not consider information modeling
of interactions. Supple’s significance lies in advancing interaction-
orientation: by specifying interactions in more detail, we can verify
protocols and agents without relying upon internal details. Expos-
ing implementations is anathema to engineering practice in any
setting and especially inapplicable in decentralized MAS.
2 BACKGROUND
We introduce information-based protocols by example. BSPL [20]
specifies protocols declaratively, constraining message via causality
and integrity, and omitting control structures (e.g., sequencing,
branching, iteration). Listing 1 shows a BSPL protocol, CreatePolicy,
to create an insurance policy between an insurer (I) and a subscriber
(S). It declares three public parameters, pID (the protocol’s key),
premium, and date. Every complete enactment of the protocol must
produce bindings for all of these parameters. The ⌜out⌝ adornment
signifies that the bindings are produced by this protocol.
Listing 1: A protocol to create an insurance policy.
Cr e a t e Po l i c y {
r o l e I , S
p a r a m e t e r o u t pID key , o u t premium , o u t date
I 7→ S : o f f e r [ o u t pID , o u t premium ]
S 7→ I : a c c ep t [ i n pID , i n premium , o u t agreed ]
S 7→ I : r e j e c t [ i n pID , i n premium , o u t date ]
I 7→ S : c r e a t e [ i n pID , i n premium , i n agreed , o u t date ]
}
CreatePolicy declares four message schemas. The ordering of
message schemas in a protocol listing is irrelevant to their oper-
ational ordering in an enactment. The message offer is directed
from the insurer to the subscriber to offer a new policy. Its two
parameters are adorned ⌜out⌝, meaning that their bindings must be
produced by the insurer when emitting an offer message. In accept,
the parameters pID and premium are adorned ⌜in⌝, meaning that
the subscriber must know the bindings of these parameters from
prior messages (e.g., offer) to emit accept. Each protocol and mes-
sage must have a key. The key parameters of a protocol are also key
parameters of its messages. Bindings of all parameters are unique
for each binding of the key parameters. Note that date is adorned
⌜out⌝ in reject and create. Hence, in any enactment of CreatePolicy,
either only reject or only create can be emitted to ensure integrity.
Figure 1 shows two valid enactments of CreatePolicy with bind-
ings of the message parameters. In Figure 1a, the subscriber accepts
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(b) S rejects offer.
Figure 1: Valid enactments of CreatePolicy.
Listing 2 illustrates protocol composition. ReportPolicy refer-
ences CreatePolicy via its public parameters, and adds twomessages.
Here, rID identifies report instances, and forms a composite key
with pID to associate multiple policies with a report. The auditor’s
request for a report is captured as request, where amount indicates
the minimum premium amount the insurer should report. BSPL
enforces no constraints besides integrity on parameter bindings.
Hence, although amount is meant as a criterion to filter the reported
policies, ReportPolicy does not represent this intuition. Hence, Re-
portPolicy’s enactments may include a report for any known pID.
Listing 2: Reporting insurance policies to an auditor.
Repo r t P o l i c y {
r o l e I , A
p a r a m e t e r o u t r ID key , o u t pID key , o u t amount , o u t
i n f o
C r e a t e Po l i c y ( I , S , o u t pID key , o u t premium , o u t date )
A 7→ I : r e qu e s t [ o u t rID , o u t amount ]
I 7→ A : r e p o r t [ i n rID , i n pID , i n amount , i n premium ,
o u t i n f o ]
}
3 TYPES IN SUPPLE
What we need is a protocol language that not only tackles decentral-
ized MAS but provides language support for information dependen-
cies. Specifically, BSPL supports ⌜out⌝–⌜in⌝ causal dependencies
but ignores ⌜in⌝–⌜out⌝ dependencies needed to correctly link the
requested minimum premium amount in request with the reported
information in report as we illustrate in Listing 2.
3.1 Atomic and Composite Causal Types
In Supple, each parameter with its adornment constitutes a distinct
causal type and may have a binding conforming to its type. For
example, in Listing 1, we interpret out pID and in pID, and out
premium and in premium as distinct causal types.
Whereas a data type in traditional languages defines how a value
may be interpreted by an application (e.g., premium is money in
Euros), a type in Supple defines the flow of information in a protocol.
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We disregard data types since they are well-known (assume they
are strings throughout) and reserve the term “type” for causal types.
In Supple, the possible bindings of a type, for which the adorn-
ment component is ⌜out⌝, include any possible binding (i.e., any
string). For instance, the parameter premium can be bound to any
string by the insurer when emitting offer, since the type of the
parameter is out premium. On the other hand, the possible bindings
of a type, for which the adornment component is ⌜in⌝, depend on
the existing bindings of the types, which share the same parameter
component, in all enactments. For instance, the possible bindings
of parameter premium in accept depend on the existing bindings of
the premium parameters in all messages.
A type is atomic when it consists of a single pair of adornment
and parameter components. A type may be a composite of multiple
atomic types. Protocols (and messages) have composite types over
their parameters’ types. For example, offer’s type in Listing 1 is the
composite type (out pID, out premium) with respect to the types of
its parameters (i.e., pID and premium). Note that an atomic type
is a special case of a composite type. That is out premium and
(out premium) correspond to the same type. However, we drop
the parentheses from the notation of a composite type when it is
defined over a single atomic type.
3.2 Causal Type of a Computation
Our main focus is the notion of the causal type of a computation,
which we denote as T : I → O, where T is a name, and I and O
are composite types. I defines the type of information on which the
computation is performed and O defines the type of information
the computation yields. For instance, a computation whose type
is c : (in pID, in premium)→ (out c.pID, out c.premium, out c.info) is
performed on the information, whose type is (in pID, in premium),
yielding to the information, whose type is (out c.pID, out c.premium,
out c.info). Note that in pID and out c.pID (and similarly in premium
and out c.premium) are different types.
The causal type of a computation enforces certain constraints
on the type of information the computation yields with respect to
the type of information on which the computation is applied.
Constraint 1: All the atomic types that form the composite type
I must have ⌜in⌝ as their adornment component. The reason is,
I defines the type of information on which the the computation
is performed. Hence, this type of information must be known to
the agent when the computation is performed, which is signified
by the ⌜in⌝ adornment.
Constraint 2: If there is an atomic type t in I, whose parameter
component isp (e.g., pID), and there is an atomic type t ′ in O, whose
parameter component includes p prefixed with T (e.g., c.pID), then
(1) t ′ must have an ⌜out⌝ adornment, and (2) the bindings of t ′
to which the computation yields, must be a subset of the existing
bindings of t when the computation is performed. That is t ′ is a
dependent type on t . This is an ⌜in⌝-⌜out⌝ dependency, which
cannot be captured in BSPL. This kind of dependency enables us to
specify the causal type of computations that perform information
filtering, which we explore in Section 3.3.
Constraint 3: If there is an atomic type t ′ in O, whose parameter
component is p without the prefix T (e.g., info without the prefix
c.), but there is no atomic type t in I, whose parameter component
is p , then t ′ must have an ⌜out⌝, which can have any binding. This
kind of types enable us to specify production of new information as
the result of a computation, which may be used to create mappings
or aggregations, which we explore in Section 3.3.
These constraints allow only certain adornments of atomic types
in I and O, which we can infer from the names of the atomic types.
Hence, we simplify the notation of causal types as follows. Using
Constraint1, we drop ⌜in⌝ adornments from the atomic types in
I. Using Constraint 2, we drop ⌜out⌝ adornments and use of T as
a prefix of atomic types in O. Using Constraint 3 we drop ⌜out⌝
adornments of atomic types in O. As a result in the rest of the paper,
instead of c : (in pID, in premium)→ (out c.pID, out c.premium, out
c.info) we write c : (pID, premium)→ (pID, premium, info).
Listing 3 shows a Supple protocol that uses the causal type c
: (pID, premium)→ (pID, premium, info) for a computation in our
scenario. The parameter c, whose type is c : (pID, premium)→ (pID,
premium, info) with the adornment component ⌜out⌝ is used in the
message request to indicate the type of computation that the auditor
requests. When emitting request, the auditor can bind the parameter
c to any computation conforming to its type. The adornment of c in
report is ⌜in⌝, meaning that the insurer must know the computation
that is bound to c in order to send an instance of a report.
Supple is indifferent to themeaning of parameter bindings. Hence,
the binding of c can be anything (i.e., a query, constraint, etc.) that
agents can interpret as a computation. Type conformance verifica-
tion methods are out of our scope but program analysis techniques
or run-time verifiers [21] can support verification.
Listing 3: Capturing causal types of computations.
R e p o r t P o l i c i e s V i aC o n s t r a i n t {
r o l e I , A
p a r a m e t e r o u t r ID key , o u t ⟦c⟧
type c : ( pID , premium )→ ( pID , premium , i n f o )
C r e a t e P o l i c y ( I , S , o u t pID key , o u t premium , o u t date )
A 7→ I : r e qu e s t [ o u t rID , o u t c ]
I 7→ A : r e p o r t [ i n rID , i n c , o u t ⟦c⟧ ]
}
Supple introduces ⟦⟧ notation to refer the yielding composite
type (i.e., O in T : I → O) of a computation. For example, in
Listing 3, report includes ⟦c⟧ which corresponds to the composite
type (out c.pID, out c.premium, out c.info).
3.3 Causal Computation Patterns
We introduce major patterns that occur in a variety of applications.
3.3.1 Filter. Filter selects a subset of a parameter’s known bind-
ings according to the criteria defined in a computation. For example,
the auditor may request the insurer to report only the policies that
satisfy some premium criteria (e.g., below of amount). Listing 4
shows ReportPremium, in which the parameter c is used to define
computations to represent such criteria. Listing 5 shows such a
computation specified as a (simplified SQL), which can be assigned
to c by the auditor for requesting only the policies with premium
between 50 and 100.
Listing 4: Reporting premiums of selected policies.
ReportPremium {
r o l e I , A
p a r a m e t e r o u t r ID key , o u t ⟦c⟧
type c : ( pID , premium )→ ( pID , premium )
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Cr e a t e Po l i c y ( I , S , o u t pID key , o u t premium , o u t date )
A 7→ I : r e qu e s t [ o u t rID , o u t c ]
I 7→ A : r e p o r t [ i n rID , i n c , o u t ⟦c⟧ ]
}
In Filter, the computation yields to a dependent type of its input.
Let K and P be the types of key and non-key parameters, respec-
tively. Filter is represented by the following type definition:
(K , P ) → (K , P )
Listing 5: Example query in SQL to filter policies.
SELECT C r e a t e Po l i c y . pID AS pID
C r e a t e Po l i c y . premium AS premium
WHERE 50 < C r e a t e Po l i c y . premium < 100
3.3.2 Map. Map transforms bindings of a tuple of parameters
yielding to new bindings for other tuple of parameters. For instance,
the auditor may request the insurer to report its debt for each claim,
which is the difference between the claimed and paid amounts.
Listing 6 defines ReportClaimDebt referring to MakeClaim, which
makes a claim for an existing policy (identified by pID), and pro-
duces bindings of cID (claim’s key), claimed, and paid amounts. In
ReportClaimDebt, the insurer’s debt for each claim (i.e., cDebt) is
computed using claimed and paid according to the computation
that is bound to c (i.e., the claimed and paid amounts of each claim
in each policy are mapped to the debt for the corresponding claim).
Note that the outcome of c includes pID, which is needed to asso-
ciate the computed debt for a claim with the corresponding policy.
Listing 6: Reporting insurer’s debt per claim.
ReportCla imDebt {
r o l e I , A
p a r a m e t e r o u t r ID key , o u t ⟦c⟧
type c : ( pID , cID , c la imed , pa id )→ ( pID , cID , cDebt )
C r e a t e P o l i c y ( I , S , o u t pID key , o u t premium , o u t date )
MakeClaim ( S , I , i n pID key , o u t cID key , o u t c la imed ,
o u t pa id )
A 7→ I : r e qu e s t [ o u t rID , o u t c ]
I 7→ A : r e p o r t [ i n rID , i n c , o u t ⟦c⟧ ]
}
Let K be a the type of key parameters, and P and R be the types
of non-key parameters. Map corresponds to the type:
(K , P ) → (K ,R)
3.3.3 Reduce. Reduce yields bindings for a parameter by aggre-
gating another parameter’s bindings. For instance, the auditor may
want to know the total debt of an insurer for each policy, a solution
to which Listing 7 illustrates. In ReportPolicyDebt, the insurer’s debt
per policy is computed using the computation bound to c, which
assigns the insurer’s debt per policy to pDebt according to cDebt re-
ferring to ReportClaimDebt. Here, the key cID is not involved in the
yielding type of c, since the reduced debt information is associated
only with policies (and reports).
Listing 7: Reporting insurer’s debt per policy.
Repo r tPo l i c yDeb t {
r o l e I , A
p a r a m e t e r i n aID key , i n q , i n c , o u t ⟦c⟧
type c : ( rID , pID , cID , cDebt )→ ( rID , pID , pDebt )
ReportCla imDebt ( I , A , o u t r ID key , o u t pID key , o u t
cID key , o u t cDebt )
I 7→ A : agg r ega t e [ i n aID , i n c , o u t ⟦c⟧ ]
}
Let K1 and K2 be the types of key parameters, and P and R be
the types of non-key parameters. Reduce corresponds to:
(K1,K2, P ) → (K2,R)
3.4 A Comprehensive Example
Listing 8 gives a comprehensive example, where the results of one
computation are used in another: the auditor requests from the
insurer reports on (1) its policies, using filter via c1; (2) its debts for
those policies, using map via c2; and, (3) its total debt over those
debts using reduce via c3.
Listing 8: Chaining computation results.
Repor t {
r o l e I , A
p a r a m e t e r o u t r ID key , o u t ⟦ c3⟧
type c1 : ( pID , premium )→ ( pID , premium )
type c2 : ( pID , c la imed , pa id )→ ( pID , debt )
type c3 : ( pID , debt )→ ( t o t a lD eb t )
C r e a t e P o l i c y ( I , S , o u t pID key , o u t premium , o u t date )
MakeClaim ( S , I , i n pID key , o u t c la imed , o u t pa id )
A 7→ I : r e q P o l i c i e s [ o u t rID , o u t c1 ]
I 7→ A : r e s P o l i c i e s [ i n rID , i n c1 , o u t ⟦ c1⟧ ]
A 7→ I : r eqDebts [ i n rID , i n ⟦ c1⟧ , o u t c2 ]
I 7→ A : r e sDeb t s [ i n rID , i n c2 , o u t ⟦ c2⟧ ]
A 7→ I : reqSum [ i n rID , i n ⟦ c2⟧ , o u t c3 ]
I 7→ A : resSum [ i n rID , i n c3 , o u t ⟦ c3⟧ ]
}
4 FORMAL MODEL AND VERIFICATION
Supple’s syntax enhances BSPL with causal types which can be
used to define the type of computations that determine bindings of
parameters. The requisite computations may be specified in any lan-
guage that the concerned agents can interpret. Computations may
be specified at design time to accommodate restricted situations
such as in contracts or regulations.
Below, superscripts ∗ and + denote zero or more, and one or
more repetitions, respectively. Delimiters ⌊ and ⌋ identify optional
expressions. Cardinality constraints are left informal for readability.
Table 1: Supple’s syntax.
Protocol −→ Name {role Role+parameter ⌊Parameter ⌊key⌋ ⌋+
⌊Type∗ ⌋Reference+ }
Reference −→ Name (Role+ Parameter+) |
Role 7→ Role : Name[Parameter+] ⌊:: Attachment ⌋
Type −→ type Name : (Parameter+) → (Parameter+)
Attachment −→ (Parameter+) → (Parameter+) {ComputationSpec }
Parameter −→ Adornment (Name | ⟦Name⟧ ⌊.Name ⌋)
Adornment −→ in | out | nil
A protocol declaration involves a name, two or more roles, one
or more parameters, zero or more type definitions, and one or more
protocol and message references. A protocol reference consists of
a name, one or more roles, and one or more parameters of the
referred protocol. Alternatively, a message reference consists of a
name, exactly two roles, one or more parameters, and an optional
computation attachment. A type definition consists of a parameter
name, and two tuples of parameters. A computation attachment
consists of two tuples of parameters and a computation specification.
A parameter consists of an adornment and a name. Alternatively,
the parameter name can be enclosed in double brackets to refer the
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outcome of a bound computation, fromwhich individual parameters
can be accessed using the ⌜·⌝ notation. An adornment is either ⌜in⌝,
⌜out⌝, or ⌜nil⌝.
4.1 Semantics
Supple’s semantics enhances BSPL’s semantics [22]. The main con-
tribution of Supple pertains to the specification of causal types.
As a result, message instances in Supple must satisfy the type of
their schema, meaning that each binding matches to the type of
the bound parameter. Below, σ⃗ denotes a finite list, which can be
treated in places as a set, and σ⃗ ↓γ⃗ denotes projection of σ⃗ on to
the elements of γ⃗ .
Definition 4.1. A protocol P is a tuple ⟨n, x⃗ , p⃗, k⃗, q⃗, F ,T ⟩, where
n is the protocol’s name and x⃗ , p⃗, k⃗, q⃗ are lists of roles, public pa-
rameters, key parameters, and private parameters, respectively,
such that k⃗ ⊆ p⃗. F is a finite set of references, such that ∀f ∈
F : f = ⟨nf , x⃗f , p⃗f , k⃗f ⟩ is a public projection of a protocol Pf =
⟨nf , x⃗f , p⃗f , k⃗f , q⃗f , Ff ,T ⟩ satisfying x⃗f ⊆ x⃗ , p⃗f ⊆ p⃗ ∪ q⃗, and k⃗f =
p⃗f ∩ k⃗ . T is a finite set of causal types, such that ∀t ∈ T : t =
⟨pt , u⃗t , w⃗t ⟩ satisfying pt ∈ p⃗ ∪ q⃗, u⃗t ⊆ p⃗ ∪ q⃗, and w⃗t ⊆ p⃗ ∪ q⃗.
T formalizes the causal types of the form T : I → O that we
introduce in Section 3.2. Specifically, in a type ⟨pt , u⃗t , w⃗t ⟩ ∈ T , pt ,
u⃗t , and w⃗t correspond toT ,I, andO, respectively. For convenience,
we treat causal types as global constructs shared by all references
of a protocol.
Definition 4.2. A message schema ⌜s 7→ r : m p⃗ (k⃗ )⌝ is an atomic
protocol ⟨m, {s, r }, p⃗, k⃗, ∅, ∅, ∅⟩ with roles s and r , and no references.
Definition 4.3. A message instancem[s, r , p⃗, v⃗] associates a mes-
sage schema ⌜s 7→ r : m p⃗ (k⃗ )⌝ with a list of values, where |v⃗ | = |p⃗ |.
Definition 4.4. A universe of discourse (UoD) is a pair ⟨R,M⟩
where R is a set of roles, andM is a set of message names, each
with its parameters, and sender and receiver roles from R.
Definition 4.5. The history of a role x , denoted by Hx , is a se-
quence of message instancesm1,m2, . . ., such that eachmi is either
emitted or received by x .
A role’s history captures the local view of the role with respect
to the message instances that are sent and received by the role.
Definition 4.6 captures when a messagem is viable in the history
of role x . Below we use p⃗I and p⃗O for the lists of ⌜in⌝ and ⌜out⌝
adorned parameters, respectively, and ⃗p⟦⟧ is the list of causal type
parameters, which are enclosed in ⟦⟧ (i.e., the computation that is
bound to the causal type parameter is performed to yield bindings
of parameters in the outcome of its type definition). Intuitively, (1)
ensures thatm is either sent or received by x ; (2) ensures thatm
does not violate uniqueness of parameter bindings; (3) ensures that
x knows the bindings of all ⌜in⌝ adorned parameters and does not
know the bindings of any ⌜out⌝ or ⌜nil⌝ adorned parameter; (4)
ensures that a causal type parameter is bound to a computation
before the computation yields to bindings; (5) ensures that, if p is a
causal type parameter that is bound to a computation, x knows the
bindings of every parameter in u⃗, before emitting the message with
the outcome of the computation that is bound to p—which satisfies
Constraint 1 in Section 3.2; and (6) ensures that for every parameter
p in w⃗ , if there is a parameter u in u⃗ whose base name is equal to p,
then the bindings of p must be a subset of the known bindings of
u—which satisfies Constraint 2 in Section 3.2. In (6) base returns the
base name of a parameter (i.e., base(p) = p, and base(p.q) = q). Note
that Definition 4.6 satisfies Constraint 3 from Section 3.2 implicitly
via (2) and (3), which ensure that ⌜out⌝ adorned parameters are
bound preserving integrity.
Definition 4.6. A message instancem[s, r , p⃗, v⃗] with key param-
eters k⃗ ⊆ p⃗ is viable at role x ’s history Hx if and only if all the
following conditions hold:
(1) r = x (reception) or s = x (emission)
(2) ∀mi [si , ri , p⃗i , v⃗i ] ∈ Hx : if k⃗ ⊆ p⃗i and v⃗i ↓k⃗= v⃗ ↓k⃗ then
v⃗i ↓p⃗∩p⃗i= v⃗ ↓p⃗∩p⃗i (messages respect keys)
(3) ∀p ∈ p⃗ : p ∈ p⃗I if and only if (∃mi [si , ri , p⃗i , v⃗i ] ∈ Hx and
p ∈ p⃗i and k⃗ ⊆ p⃗i )
(4) ∀p ∈ p⃗ : if p ∈ (p⃗O ∩ p⃗⟦⟧ ) then ∃mi [si , ri , p⃗i , v⃗i ] ∈ Hx and
p ∈ p⃗i and k⃗ ⊆ p⃗i .
(5) ∀p ∈ p⃗ : if p ∈ p⃗⟦⟧ and ⟨p, u⃗, w⃗⟩ ∈ T then ∀ui ∈ u⃗ :
∃mi [si , ri , p⃗i , v⃗i ] ∈ Hx and ui ∈ p⃗i and k⃗ ⊆ p⃗i
(6) ∀p ∈ p⃗ : if ⟨q, u⃗, w⃗⟩ ∈ T and p ∈ w⃗ and u ∈ u⃗ and base(p) =
base(u) then ∃mi [si , ri , p⃗i , v⃗i ] ∈ Hx and k⃗ ⊆ p⃗i and v⃗i ↓k⃗=
v⃗ ↓k⃗ and v⃗i ↓u= v⃗ ↓p
An enactment of a protocol is a vector of its roles’ histories.
Definition 4.7. Let ⟨R,M⟩ be a UoD. A history vector over ⟨R,M⟩
is [H1, . . . ,H |R | , such that ∀s, r : 1 ≤ s, r ≤ |R| ⇒ H s is a history
and (∀m[s, r , p⃗, v⃗] ∈ H r : m ∈ M andm[s, r , p⃗, v⃗] ∈ H s ).
Definition 4.8. A history vector is viable if and only if each of its
histories is empty or it arises from the addition of the emission or
reception of a viable message by any role to a viable history vector.
Definition 4.9. Let ⟨R,M⟩ be a UoD. The universe of enactments
UR,M for ⟨R,M⟩ is the set of viable history vectors with exactly
|R | dimensions over the instances of messages inM.
Definition 4.10. The intension of a message schema ⌜s 7→ r : m
p⃗ (k⃗ )⌝ for the UoD ⟨R,M⟩ is ([s 7→ r : m p⃗ (k⃗ )])R,M = {H |H ∈
UR,M and ∃v⃗, i, j : H si =m[s, r , p⃗, v⃗] and H rj =m[s, r , p⃗, v⃗].
Definition 4.11. Let P = ⟨n, x⃗ , p⃗, k⃗, q⃗, F ,T ⟩ be a protocol. The
intension of P for the UoD ⟨R,M⟩ is ([P])R,M = (∪cover(P,G )
(∩Gi ∈G ([Gi ])R,M )) ↓x⃗ , where cover(P,G ) ≡ G ⊆ F such that
∀p ∈ p⃗ : (∃Gi ∈ G : Gi = ⟨ni ,xi ,pi ⟩ and p ∈ p⃗i ).
Definition 4.12. Let P = ⟨n, x⃗ , p⃗, k⃗, q⃗, F ,T ⟩ be a protocol. The
universe of discourse of P is UoD(P) = ⟨roles(P),msgs(P)⟩, where
roles(P) = x⃗ ∪ (∪i roles(Fi )) and msgs(P) = ∪iFi .
4.2 Liveness and Safety
Liveness and safety are two key properties of Supple protocols. A
protocol is live if every enactment of the protocol can be completed
by producing bindings of all public parameters.
Definition 4.13. A protocol P is live if and only if each history
vector in the protocol’s universe of enactments UoD(P) can be
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extended through finitely many message emissions and receptions
to a history vector in UoD(P) that is complete.
A protocol is safe if no key constraint is violated despite local
decisions on messages emitted by each role.
Definition 4.14. A protocol P is safe if and only if each history
vector in its ([P])UoD(P) is safe. A history vector is safe if and only
if all key uniqueness constraints apply across all histories in it.
Liveness and safety in Supple go beyond those of BSPL. In Supple,
liveness requires, if there is causal type parameter that is bound
to a computation, the role, who performs the computation, must
know the bindings of the parameters on which the computation
is performed. For instance, consider LivenessFailure in Listing 9,
which is a variant of ReportClaimDebt in Listing 6.
Listing 9: Liveness fails for variant of ReportClaimDebt.
L i v e n e s s F a i l u r e {
r o l e I , A , S
p a r a m e t e r o u t r ID key , o u t ⟦ c2⟧
type c1 : ( pID , cID , c la imed , pa id )→ ( pID , cID , cDebt )
type c2 : ( pID , cID , comp la in t )→ ( pID , cID , cDebt )
/ / C r e a t e P o l i c y and MakeClaim as b e f o r e
A 7→ I : a ud i tRepo r tReque s t [ o u t rID , o u t c1 ]
I 7→ A : aud i tRepo r t [ i n rID , i n c1 , o u t ⟦ c1⟧ ]
S 7→ A : comp la in tSubmi s s i on [ o u t rID , o u t comp la in t ]
A 7→ I : c omp la in tRepo r tReques t [ i n rID , o u t c2 ]
I 7→ A : comp la in tRepo r t [ i n rID , i n c2 , o u t ⟦ c2⟧ ]
}
LivenessFailure includes an additional causal type c2 and new
messages complaintSubmission, complaintReportRequest, and com-
plaintReport to capture the scenario where a subscriber makes a
complaint about a policy to the auditor, and the auditor requests a
report from the insurer about the policy that is subject to the com-
plaint. The type definition of c2 requires complaint to be available
to the insurer. However, complaint appears only in complaintSub-
mission, which is sent from the subscriber to the auditor. Thus, the
insurer can never send a complaintReport in any enactment where it
receives a complaintReportRequest message. Note that some enact-
ments of LivenessFailure can be completed, e.g., enactments where
the auditor sends a auditReportRequest, which does not refer to c2.
This protocol would be live if complaint was included as an ⌜in⌝
parameter in complaintReportRequest.
Safety of a protocol means that each of its enactments ensures
integrity of information exchanged. Safety may be violated if two
or more roles (1) as in BSPL, may bind the same parameter; or (2)
as added by Supple, concurrently perform the computation that
is bound to a causal type parameter. For instance, SafetyFailure in
Listing 10, where the auditor requests the total claimed amount for
a policy from both insurer and subscriber, is unsafe.
Listing 10: Safety failure.
S a f e t y F a i l u r e {
r o l e I , A , S
p a r a m e t e r o u t r ID key , o u t ⟦c⟧
type c : ( pID , cID , cClaim )→ ( pID , pClaim )
/ / C r e a t e P o l i c y and MakeClaim as b e f o r e
A 7→ I : r e qTo t a lCa l im I [ o u t rID , o u t c ]
A 7→ S : r eqTo ta lC l a imS [ i n rID , i n c ]
I 7→ A : r e pTo t a lC l a im I [ i n rID , i n c , o u t ⟦c⟧ ]
S 7→ A : r epTo ta lC l a imS [ i n rID , i n c , o u t ⟦c⟧ ]
}
Both repTotalClaimI and repTotalClaimS use the same computa-
tion bound to c to determine the total claims for a policy. However,
because of asynchrony, the same information is not available to all
parties and applying the same computation may produce different
results, thus violating integrity. For example, in Figure 2, which
shows a possible enactment omitting the binding of c for readability,
the auditor sends reqTotalClaimI and reqTotalClaimS to the insurer
and subscriber, respectively. The insurer computes the total claim
amount for the policy, where pID is equal to p1, before receiving the
submitClaim message of the subscriber. Hence, the insurer sends
repTotalClaimI with pClaim of 0 to the auditor. In the meantime,
the subscriber submits a claim for 15 to the insurer and, therefore,
responds to the auditor’s request by sending repTotalClaimS with
pClaim of 15. As a result, the auditor receives inconsistent bindings










Figure 2: Integrity of pClaim is violated in unsafe protocol.
4.3 Verification of Supple Protocols
To verify correctness, we derive the following propositional logic
expressions from a Supple protocol (1) C: its causal structure, indi-
cating how information flows via its messages; (2) S: its unsafety,
i.e., that twomessages that produce bindings for the same parameter
both occur; and (3) L: its liveness failure, i.e., some parameters re-
main unbound even tough every agent sends every viable message,
and the infrastructure delivers all messages. Safety and liveness
hold when C ∧ S and C ∧ L, respectively, are unsatisfiable.
Algorithm 1 defines the algorithm to create the causal struc-
ture of a protocol as a propositional logic expression. Algorithm 1
creates the expression step by step by as a conjunction of subex-
pression. For readability, we define the subexpressions separately
in Definitions 4.15–4.19.
Algorithm 1: Generation of the causal structure of a protocol
P as a proposition logic expression.
input :P = ⟨n, x⃗ , p⃗, k⃗, q⃗, F ,T ⟩
output :CP // expression of P’s causal structure
CP ← message-reception-exp // Definition 4.15
CP ← CP ∧ information-transmission-exp // Definition 4.16
CP ← CP ∧ information-reception-exp // Definition 4.17
CP ← CP ∧ information-minimality-exp // Definition 4.18
CP ← CP ∧message-ordering-exp // Definition 4.19
return CP
Given a protocol P = ⟨n, x⃗ , p⃗, k⃗, q⃗, F ,T ⟩, Algorithm 1 uses the
following sets of propositional symbols. (1) A finite set P of px
symbols for each parameter p ∈ p⃗ ∪ q⃗ and for each role x ∈ x⃗ ,
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which model observation of p by x . (2) A finite setM ofmx symbols
for each message m ∈ F and for each role x ∈ x⃗ , which model
observation ofm by x . (3) A finite set of bei ,ej symbols for every
(ei , ej ) pair in P ∪M, which model observation of ei before ej . For
readability, we write bei ,ej in predicate form as before (ei , ej ). (4) A
finite set of tei ,ej symbols for every (ei , ej ) pair in P ∪M, which
model observation of ei together with ej . For readability, we write
tei ,ej in predicate form as together (ei , ej ).
Definitions 4.15–4.19 define the subexpressions in Algorithm 1.
We provide examples for Report protocol in Listing 8.
Definition 4.15. (Message Reception) A message is received only
if it is emitted earlier:∧
m∈F
(¬mr ∨ before (ms ,mr ))
For message reqDebts, Definition 4.15 yields to the expression
¬reqDebtsI ∨ before (reqDebtsA , reqDebtsI ).
Definition 4.16. (Information Transmission) For every message
schema ⌜s 7→ r : m p⃗ (k⃗ )⌝ ∈ F , s either does not emitm, or:
• s observes all ⌜in⌝ parameters in p⃗ that are not bound to a




before (ps ,ms )
• and, s observes all ⌜in⌝ parameters in the outcome of all







before (ps ,ms ))
• and, s observes all the requisite parameters of all ⌜out⌝







before (ps ,ms ))
• and, s observes all ⌜out⌝ parameters in p⃗ that are not bound




together (ps ,ms )
• and, s observes all the outcome parameters of all ⌜out⌝ causal







together (ps ,ms ))
Hence, we generate:∧
m∈F
(¬ms ∨ (exp1 ∧ exp2 ∧ exp3 ∧ exp4 ∧ exp5))
For example, for ⌜A 7→ I: reqDebts[in rID, in ⟦c1⟧, out c2]⌝ and
c1 of type (pID, premium)→(pID, premium), Definition 4.16 yields to
¬reqDebtsA∨(before (rIDA , reqDebtsA )∧ before (pIDA , reqDebtsA )∧
before (premiumA , reqDebtsA )∧ together (c2A , reqDebtsA )).
Definition 4.17. (Information Reception) For everymessage schema
⌜s 7→ r : m p⃗ (k⃗ )⌝ ∈ F , r either does not observem, or r observes all





(before (pr ,mr ) ∨ together (pr ,mr ))))
For example, considering only premium for brevity, for message
⌜I 7→ A: resPolicies[in rID, in c1, out ⟦c1⟧]⌝ and c1 of type (pID,
premium)→(pID, premium) Definition 4.17 yields ¬resPoliciesA∨
(before (premiumA , resPoliciesA ) ∨(together (premiumA , resPoliciesA ))):
Definition 4.18. (Information Minimality) For every role x in x⃗
and parameter p in p⃗, p is either not observed or p is observed
together with a messagem in F (for readability, assume that F ′ ⊆ F
such that ⌜s 7→ r : m p⃗m (k⃗m )⌝ ∈ F and (x = s or x = r , and
p ∈ p⃗m )): ∧




together (px ,mx ))
Definition 4.19. (Ordering) For every pair of messages mi and
mj in F that are emitted by x in x⃗ , x may observe them in some
order, but not together (for readability, assume that F ′ ⊆ F such
that ⌜s 7→ r : m p⃗m (k⃗m )⌝ ∈ F , and x = s):∧
mi ,m j ∈F ′
(¬mis ∨ ¬mjs ∨ before (mis ,mjs ) ∨ before (mjs ,mis ))
4.3.1 Correctness of Causal Structure Generation. Let P be a
protocol for which Algorithm 1 generates the causal structure CP .
Theorem 4.20. (Correspondence) For every viable history vector
of P, there is a model of CP , and vice versa.
Proof Sketch. We use induction in the forward direction. An
empty H corresponds to an empty CP without any propositions.
Inductively, for every viable message m that extends H , we can
extend CP form’s emission using the above information transmis-
sion clauses, and form’s reception using the reception clause. Con-
versely, given CP , we can constructH , simply appending messages
instances that correspond to the message emission and reception
propositions to the histories of the corresponding roles. □
Theorem 4.21. (Termination) Algorithm 1 always terminates.
Proof Sketch. The lists of roles, messages, and parameters of
a protocol are finite, and the rules in Definitions 4.15–4.19, when
applied to finite lists, generate finite expressions. Algorithm 1 uses
each rule once and terminates. □
4.3.2 Safety. A protocol’s safety requires that, if any parameter
is adorned ⌜out⌝ in two or more messages, only one of these mes-
sages is emitted. Hence, integrity of parameter bindings cannot be
violated. This means that for any pair of messagesmi andmj in a
protocol (and with corresponding ⌜out⌝ adorned parameters piO




O , ∅, we must not infer the
clausemis i ∧m
j
s j from the causal structure of a protocol.
Definition 4.22. Given a protocol’s list of messages F , let f⃗ be
the list of every message pair (mi ,mj ) for which piO and p
j
O are the
respective ⌜out⌝ adorned parameters and piO ∩ p
j
O , ∅. Unsafety
expression of the protocol is:∨
(mi ,m j )∈f⃗
(mis ∧mjs )
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Let P be a protocol, CP be the causal structure of P, and SP
be the unsafety expression of P as in Definition 4.22. We decide on
P’s safety by checking unsatisfiability of CP ∧ SP .
Theorem 4.23. A protocol P is safe if and only if CP ∧SP is not
satisfiable.
Proof Sketch. If CP ∧ SP is satisfiable, by Theorem 4.20, we
can construct a history vector that contains at least two mes-
sages that bind the same ⌜out⌝ adorned parameter. Conversely,
if CP ∧SP is not satisfiable, by Theorem 4.20, we cannot construct
a history vector that contains more than one message to bind the
same ⌜out⌝ adorned parameter. □
4.3.3 Liveness. A protocol’s is live if every enactment of the
protocol can be completed (i.e., every public parameter are bound).
To verify liveness of a protocol, we represent its incompleteness as
follows. First, we consider lack of a public parameter’s observation.
That is, for each public parameter p, we create a conjunction that
is composed of negated px symbols for each role x who observes p
in a message, and compose these clauses into a disjunction.
Definition 4.24. (Lack of Public Parameter Observation) Let p⃗ be
the list of a protocol’s public parameters and Xp be the set of roles
in the protocol who are either sender or receiver of at least one








Second, to avoid situations in which an agent intentionally de-
cides not to emit any of the currently viable messages, we should
have an expression to ensure that if a sender of a message observes
its ⌜in⌝ adorned parameters but does not observe its ⌜out⌝ adorned
parameters, then the sender observes the message.
Definition 4.25. (Emission Enforcement of Viable Messages) Letm
be a message, p⃗mI and p⃗
m
O be the list of ⌜in⌝ and ⌜out⌝ adorned











Third, to avoid situations where a lossy communication channel
drops some of the emitted messages, we should have an expression
to ensure that every emitted message is received
Definition 4.26. (Nonlossy Channel) Let m be a message with





Let, LP be expa ∧ expb ∧ expc , where expa , expb , and expc are
the corresponding expressions in Definitions 4.24, 4.25, and 4.26,
respectively, for protocol P. We decide on the liveness of P by
checking unsatisfiability of CP ∧ LP .
Theorem 4.27. A protocol P is live if and only if CP ∧LP is not
satisfiable.
Proof Sketch. If CP ∧ LP is satisfiable, by Theorem 4.20, we
can construct a viable history vector that cannot be extended via
message emission (maximality) or reception (lossless transmission),
and yet is incomplete. Conversely, if P is live, we know that each
history vector of P is either complete or can be finitely extended to
a complete history vector. Hence, CP ∧ LP is not satisfiable. □
5 DISCUSSION
Supple introduces a new abstraction of types in protocols, on which
there is little work, and supporting checking of important properties.
These contributions coincide with the growing interest in richer
data-aware specifications. As noted in Section 1, existing work
when it applies types does so only for static purposes (ontology
annotations on fields). It doesn’t consider information modeling of
interactions, let alone the advanced typing techniques we introduce.
Our overarching contribution lies in elucidating an important
aspect of information-based protocols via causal types. Supple ex-
tends information-based protocol specification approaches with
causal types for constraining the information that is communicated
in a protocol. Supple treats causal type parameters as first-class
information parameters, which enables the agents (1) to define com-
putations during enactment of a protocol, and (2) to communicate
them and their results as they communicate any other information.
Supple formalizes causal types and incorporates them into verifi-
cation of a protocol’s safety and liveness. At the technical level,
Supple provides a flexible and formal method to define constraints
on the exchanged information in a protocol.
Aspects of data have begun to receive more attention in protocol
specification. HAPN [24] complements state machine-based repre-
sentation of protocols with guards and effects. A major conceptual
difference is that HAPN supports system parameters, whose bind-
ings are produced exogenously to the interaction, indicating shared
state between agents and incorporation of internal decision-making
in the specification of public interactions. In Supple, by contrast,
interaction state as captured by parameter bindings is neither global
nor includes any agent’s internal state. SPY [18] adds assertions to
session types to constrain communicated values. However, neither
HAPN nor SPY support causal types as in Supple.
Winikoff and Cranefield [23] study the testability of BDI agent
programs and identify challenges in scalability. Supple could fa-
cilitate helping manage those challenges in a MAS setting in two
ways. First, the decoupling of agents through interactions would
reduce the verification problem to each agent separately. Second,
the existence of a strong type discipline can reduce the burden on
testing by eliminating certain kinds of interaction errors early.
At the conceptual level, Supple’s contribution is in line with the
challenge of connecting operational and meaning-based protocol
specifications [15]. In fact, most previous formalizations of commit-
ments and norms, in general, are in terms of computations [1, 5, 7],
and could thus benefit from Supple’s enhancements.
An interesting future direction is whether norm-related compu-
tations can be mapped at least partially to Supple computations
with the aim of regimenting some interactions. Splee gives the ex-
ample of auctions: the auctioneer’s commitment to seller to declare
the highest bidder as winner yields a query attachment (i.e., a com-
putation in Supple) that aggregates over all bids receives to produce
a binding for winner. Security is an interesting direction: norms
could be used to generate information protocols with computations
that serve as policies, e.g., for privacy.
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